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PART I
Recovering What Has Been Forgotten
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I. BIG M’S LEGACY
At a time of first-impression decision-making under the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms,1 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.2 set section 2 on an auspicious
course, defining freedom in imperative terms as the absence of coercion or
constraint. When a drugstore invoked section 2(a)’s guarantee of religious freedom
to challenge a Sunday closing law, Justice Dickson took the improbable step of
establishing a bedrock conception of freedom.3 Though corporate store hours may
not be the constitutional stuff of forcing schoolchildren to join in patriotic exercises,
Big M is to the Charter what Flag Salute is to the first amendment.4 In disparate
settings and constitutional traditions, these iconic decisions paired deep insight with
literary flair to offer matchless reflections on the essence of freedom.
Thirty-five years later, Big M remains freedom’s first and most important legacy
* Professor Emeritus, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. I thank Brian Bird,
Dwight Newman, Q.C. and Derek Ross for inviting me to participate in this project, and I am
especially grateful to each for their insightful comments on my draft. I also thank Justice Peter
Lauwers for his generous and perceptive comments. Finally, I thank Matti Thurlin (J.D./M.A.
2021) and Bailey Fox (J.D. 2019) for their thoughts and insights, and Ryan Ng (J.D. 2021),
my RA, for his research support on this project. I also owe great thanks to Sarah Mix-Ross
for her assistance with footnotes and editing, and her careful attention to detail.
1 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “the Charter”].
2 [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Big M”].
3 Big M challenged s. 4 of the Lord’s Day Act, federal legislation that prohibited any work
or commercial activity on “the Lord’s Day” (i.e., Sunday).
4 See West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (U.S.S.C. 1943)
(propounding a theory of freedom and upholding a first amendment challenge, by Jehovah’s
Witness children, to mandatory flag salute).
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under the Charter.5 It is a rich but mixed legacy. While Justice Dickson’s aspirational
call for a generous but not legalistic interpretation of rights had monumental
influence, the other part of Big M’s legacy — its vital core — fared less well.6
Unfortunately, Big M’s simple and formative definition of freedom failed to infuse
or substantially influence the section 2 jurisprudence. Today, section 2’s guarantees
are less meaningful as a result.7
The papers in this collection on the Charter’s forgotten freedoms demonstrates
how section 2’s guarantees and promises have been “forgotten” or slighted in
different ways.8 Yet oversights and deficits in the jurisprudence are not limited to
elements of text that have been overlooked, but extend to the concept of freedom
itself. Even as Charter claims succeeded, an overarching concept or theory of
section 2’s fundamental freedoms was lost in the details of decision-making. That
centerpiece of section 2 constitutionalism is largely missing and must be supplied:
freedom is cherished but fragile, and vulnerable to the impulse to suppress what is
unfamiliar, unwelcome and a threat to dominant values. Freedom cannot be robust,
across section 2’s guarantees, until its vital principles are securely embedded in the
jurisprudence and culture of the Charter.
Exploring the heart of section 2 constitutionalism begins, as it must, with Big M
and its legacy of freedom. Despite its stature as an icon of Charter interpretation, Big
M’s conception of freedom was sidelined in section 2’s evolution, and must be
restored. In this, sections 2(b) and (d) are instructive because the Court’s landmark
decisions on expressive and associational freedom bear little resemblance to Big M.9
5 Big M’s 35th anniversary was April 24, 2020. See Brian Bird & Derek Ross, “The
Charter, freedom and a drugstore” The Lawyer’s Daily (April 24, 2020), online: <https://
www.thelawyersdaily.ca/articles/18753/the-charter-freedom-and-a-drugstore-brian-bird-and-
derek-ross​>.
6 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 344 (S.C.C.)
(stating that this approach is aimed at “securing for individuals the full benefit of the
Charter’s protection”, without overshooting the “actual” purpose of rights and freedoms).
7 Section 2(c) of the Charter, which guarantees freedom of peaceful assembly, has not
generated Supreme Court jurisprudence, yet before generated. See Basil S. Alexander,
“Exploring a More Independent Freedom of Peaceful Assembly in Canada” (2018) 8:1
Western J. Leg. Stud.; and in this collection, see Nnaemeka Ezeani, “Understanding Freedom
of Peaceful Assembly in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” and Kristopher E.G.
Kinsinger, “Positive Freedoms and Peaceful Assemblies: Reenvisioning Section 2(c) of the
Charter”.
8 See, generally, The Forgotten Freedoms Project.
9 Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927
(S.C.C.) (s. 2(b)); the “Labour Trilogy” (s. 2(d)): Reference re Public Service Employee
Relations Act (Alberta), [1987] S.C.J. No. 10, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 (S.C.C.); Public Service
Alliance Canada v. Canada, [1987] S.C.J. No. 9, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424 (S.C.C.); Retail,
Wholesale and Department Store Union v. Saskatchewan, [1987] S.C.J. No. 8, [1987] 1
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While Big M’s legacy rests, principally, on a definition of freedom as the absence of
coercion or constraint, the section 2(b) jurisprudence went in another direction,
focusing on a methodology of limits that served more to subvert than protect
expressive freedom. Meanwhile, section 2(d)’s guarantee of associational freedom
was literally paralyzed by the Court’s inability to conceive a right of association.
Amid fractured decision-making, the jurisprudence failed to protect the entitlement
or generate a definition of associational freedom. Among other things, section 2(d)’s
anomalous evolution had adverse consequences for the concept of non-association,
or freedom from compelled association.
Big M marked a moment of conceptual imagination that has been lost, obscured
or forgotten in the evolution of the Charter’s fundamental freedoms. In the process,
the guarantees were shortchanged by deficits in the interpretive methodology.
Confronting those deficits is the initial step in working toward a prescriptive theory
of these freedoms. Though offering a theory here is premature, the discussion
explains how Big M’s legacy offers a conceptual vantage and starting point in
framing a theory of section 2 constitutionalism.
II. BIG M’S CONCEPTION OF FREEDOM
Remarkably, Big M transcended the less than compelling issue of corporate relief
from Sunday closing and proposed a definition of freedom. In this, section 2(a)
served as the setting for a conception, not only of religious freedom, but of all the
Charter’s fundamental freedoms. If the Court’s vision of a “truly free society” was
informed by the history of persecution by and against religious communities, Big
M’s message that state-prescribed coercion or constraint profoundly violates section
2 could hardly have been clearer.10 Even as the jurisprudence protected section 2’s
entitlements over the years, Big M stands apart as the Court’s signature decision and
monument to freedom.
Big M was emphatic that the Charter proscribes the state from interfering with
freedom, especially and including through forms of state-based coercion. Declaring
that “[o]ne of the major purposes of the Charter is to protect, within reason, from
compulsion or restraint”, Justice Dickson pronounced that no one who is compelled
by the state, either to act or refrain from taking an action, is “truly free”.11 His
conception of coercion was broad and inclusive, incorporating indirect as well as
direct or “blatant” forms of control.12 Big M also linked permissible limits to a
concept of harm, stating that section 2(a) prevents the government from “compelling
individuals to perform or abstain from performing otherwise harmless acts”.13 In
S.C.R. 460 (S.C.C.) [collectively, hereinafter “Labour Trilogy”].
10 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 336 (S.C.C.).
11 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 336 (S.C.C.).
12 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 336 (S.C.C.).
13 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 350 (S.C.C.)
[emphasis added].
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this, Dickson J. insisted that actions do not become harmful because of their
religious significance to others. In principle, Big M’s exegesis on freedom meant that
a Sunday closing law simply restricting store hours was as offensive as more blatant
forms of coercion.14
Though it can be overlooked, Big M linked coercion and constraint, showing how
the two can be combined to pose dual threats to freedom. The nuance is that a
constraint may prohibit but not compel an action. Sunday closing was instructive,
because the law prohibited stores from being open on Sunday and compelled
businesses to observe the Christian Sabbath.15 Big M was alive to that dynamic,
dating the pairing of coercion and constraint at least to the reign of Henry VIII, when
mandatory religious observance was combined with restrictions on the religious
practices of other denominations.16
A confluence of coercion and constraint compounds the interference with
freedom, in turn demanding heightened scrutiny under the Charter. A few years after
Big M, Bill 101 presented another model of regulation that prohibited one activity
and compelled another. There, Quebec’s sign law banned businesses from adver-
tising in their language of choice and mandated French as the exclusive language of
outdoor signage. While Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General) invalidated the con-
straint on choice of language, Devine v. Quebec (Attorney General) cited Big M and
held that compelling the use of French also violated the Charter.17 Albeit without
discussing or referring to Big M, the Court invalidated dual violations on other
occasions, including RJR-Macdonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)18 and
Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General).19 In RJR-Macdonald, the federal government
placed an absolute ban on tobacco advertising and compelled companies to place an
unattributed government warning on cigarette packages. In Libman v. Quebec,
provincial referendum legislation essentially prohibited third party participation in
referendum campaigns and compelled citizens to participate, if at all, by associating
with state-prescribed “yes” or “no” national committees.
The Court was less sympathetic when faced with dual violations in other
14 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.).
Compare R. v. Edwards Books & Art Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. 70, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 (S.C.C.)
(upholding a provincial Sunday closing law, in large part, because the regulation addressed
secular and not religious objectives).
15 Some Christian denominations, such as Seventh-day Adventists, do not recognize
Sunday as the Sabbath.
16 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 318 (S.C.C.).
17 Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] S.C.J. No. 88, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Ford”]; Devine v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] S.C.J. No. 89, [1988] 2
S.C.R. 790 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Devine”] [known collectively as the “Bill 101 cases”].
18 [1995] S.C.J. No. 68, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “RJR-Macdonald”].
19 [1997] S.C.J. No. 85, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569 (S.C.C.).
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instances. For example, Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson upheld an
arbitrator’s order compelling an employer to write a letter of reference of prescribed
content and absolutely prohibiting additional comments or information.20 Many
years later, an issue arose under section 2(a) when members of a religious
community were prohibited from driving without a photo licence and were
compelled — in order to drive — to violate religious conviction.21 Big M’s insight
on coercion mattered little in Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, where
the analysis focused on a distinction between direct compulsion and a law’s
“incidental and unintended” effects.22 That distinction enabled the majority opinion
to uphold the photo requirement on the pretext that members of the community had
a meaningful choice between maintaining religious observance and not driving, or
driving and not maintaining religious observance.23 In this way, what Big M would
readily have classified as coercion was presented in Wilson Colony as a meaningful
choice between being coerced to violate an observance and constrained from
driving.24
More recently, the duality of coercion and constraint has arisen with fresh urgency
under Quebec’s Bill 21, An Act respecting the laicity of the State, which prohibits
individuals from wearing apparel that represents a form or symbol of religious
observance, as a condition of providing or receiving most government services.25
While clearly a constraint on religious observance, Bill 21 is also an insidious
compulsion of identity that coerces compliance in public with a state-prescribed
policy of secularity. Legislation flagrantly affronting the admonition that “[a]ttempts
to compel belief or practice [deny] the reality of individual conscience” comprises
a dual violation that vitally infringes section 2’s freedoms of religion, expression and
20 [1989] S.C.J. No. 45, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038 (S.C.C.). With Beetz and Lamer JJ.
dissenting separately, Dickson J., the author of Big M, wrote the majority opinion in this case.
See Beetz J., stating that coercing a mandatory letter of recommendation constituted a
“violation of the freedoms of opinion and expression” (at 1061 S.C.R.) [emphasis added].
21 Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] S.C.J. No. 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R.
567 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Wilson Colony”]. For members of the Colony, a photograph is
prohibited because it is a “likeness” and prohibited by the Second Commandment.
22 [2009] S.C.J. No. 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567, at paras. 92-94 (S.C.C.).
23 Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] S.C.J. No. 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R.
567, at paras. 97-98 (S.C.C.).
24 Similarly, the Court did not consider Bill 101’s sign law as a meaningful choice
between using French and not advertising at all. See Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General),
[1988] S.C.J. No. 88, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 (S.C.C.) and Devine v. Quebec (Attorney General),
[1988] S.C.J. No. 89, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 790 (S.C.C.), known collectively as the “Bill 101
cases”.
25 Bill 21, An Act respecting the laicity of the State, 1st Sess., 42d Leg., Quebec, 2019
(assented to June 16, 2019), S.Q. 2019, c. 12 [hereinafter “Bill 21”].
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association.26
As shown, the pairing of coercion and compulsion represents a persistent threat
to freedom that can reach troubling proportions. Big M’s mindfulness of the dual
threat must be addressed in the jurisprudence, whenever it surfaces, and not
forgotten.
Big M’s insight on the question of per se violation — in principle, a form of rights
exceptionalism — is another part of its legacy that has been largely forgotten. There,
the Court set its conception of freedom apart, untempered or offset by reasonable
limits under section 1. Justice Dickson was adamant that an ultra vires purpose
cannot be saved by section 1 and, from that perspective, the Sunday closing law was
unconstitutional because its religious purpose was per se a violation of section
2(a).27 Moreover, in stating that not every government interest or policy objective is
“entitled to” consideration under section 1, he suggested that some violations are by
definition outside the scope of justification.28
That part of Big M’s legacy was displaced, and the concept of a violation that
cannot be saved effectively disappeared when the Oakes test emerged one year
later.29 That framework changed the calculus immeasurably, including the assump-
tion that every breach is subject to justification under section 1. Even without Oakes,
it is uncertain how Big M’s proposition that some violations cannot be justified
would have fared. Regardless, a vital perspective on the nature and severity of a
breach was lost. The Oakes framework and its assumption that every breach is
subject to justification under s.1 changed the calculus immeasurably.30 Rendered
26 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 345 (S.C.C.).
Not only does it explicitly violate freedom of religious belief and practice, Bill 21 infringes
expressive freedom and compels members of religious communities publicly to express and
be associated with a mandatory policy of state secularity. Section 33 of Bill 21 invokes s. 33
of the Charter, the legislative override or notwithstanding clause, to exempt it from challenge
under most Charter guarantees, including s. 2’s fundamental freedoms. Note, however, that
Justice Gascon cited Big M and relied on Big M in discussing the state’s duty of religious
neutrality in Mouvement laïque québécois v. Saguenay (City), [2015] S.C.J. No. 16, [2015]
2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
27 That is why Big M’s corporate status was not at issue under s. 2(a). See also Quebec
(Attorney General) v. Quebec Assn. of Protestant School Boards, [1984] S.C.J. No. 31,
[1984] 2 S.C.R. 66 (S.C.C.) (describing Bill 101’s limits on English-language instruction in
Quebec schools as an “archetype” of regimes requiring reform under the Charter and not
“legitimate” under s. 1 as a result).
28 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 352 (S.C.C.).
29 R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.) (establishing a structured
framework for analyzing the justifiability of Charter violations under s. 1).
30 But see Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] S.C.J. No. 45, [1989] 1
S.C.R. 1038, at 1061 (S.C.C.), per Beetz J., dissenting, pronouncing that an order compelling
a former employer to provide a letter of prescribed content was “totalitarian in nature” and
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almost invisible in the analytical symmetry of rights and limits — and attendant
focus on section 1 — was the insight that some infringements are so offensive to the
Charter’s purposes as to defy justification.31 A form of rights exceptionalism
remains in place for section 7’s principles of fundamental justice, but not elsewhere
in the jurisprudence.32 As its acquiescence in grave violations attests, the Court’s
attention to the severity of the breach has been uneven over the years.33
Big M represents an early and unexpected high-water mark for freedom, offering
a singular conception that was not tethered to the methodology of a formal balance
between rights and limits. Surprisingly, Big M had little or no influence on the
Court’s “landmark” decisions under sections 2(b) and (d), or on the evolution of the
section 2 jurisprudence. It is uncertain whether Big M’s authority was diminished
because section 1 was taken out of the equation and not discussed; alternatively, the
Court may not have considered its conception of freedom informative, holistically,
of section 2. Either way, Big M’s trailblazing insights — on the state as a threat to
freedom, on the pairing of coercion and constraint, on the concept of per se violation
— have been overlooked, if not forgotten, in section 2’s evolution. While section
2(b)’s guarantee of expressive freedom developed a methodology of limits,
protection for associational freedom under section 2(d) stalled at the outset, as
discussed in the following two sections, respectively.
can “never be justified under s. 1” [emphasis added]. See also Delisle v. Canada (Attorney
General), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989, at para. 110 (dissenting opinion).
31 In a panel we participated in, Dwight Newman and Brian Bird made this point another
way, suggesting that s. 2(b)’s forgotten entitlements — the inner rights of thought and belief
— might be absolute or near absolute entitlements. See the Charter Day webinar:
“Celebrating Canada’s Fundamental (and Sometimes Forgotten) Freedoms” (April 17, 2020),
online: Christian Legal Fellowship <http://www.christianlegalfellowship.org/forgottenfree-
doms​>. See also Brian Bird, “Are All Charter Rights and Freedoms Really Non-Absolute?”
(2017) 40 Dal. L.J. 107; Dwight Newman, “Interpreting Freedom of Thought in the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (2019) 91 S.C.L.R. (2d) 107.
32 Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 5, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331, at para.
95 (S.C.C.) (confirming that although it is difficult to save violations of s. 7’s principles of
fundamental justice under s. 1, “in some instances” the state may be able to show that the
breach is justifiable). See also R. v. Michaud, [2015] O.J. No. 4540, 2015 ONCA 585 (Ont.
C.A.) (justifying a highway regulation that violated s. 7 under s. 1).
33 Decisions that have permitted the overt silencing of certain voices are particularly
problematic. Examples include R. v. Lucas, [1998] S.C.J. No. 28, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 439
(S.C.C.) (upholding criminal defamatory libel convictions against individuals protesting a
miscarriage of justice), see discussion infra; Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada
(Minister of Justice), [2000] S.C.J. No. 66, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120 (S.C.C.) (failing, in the face
of cumulative, purposeful and grave violations of rights, to grant an effective remedy); and
Baier v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 31, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 673 (S.C.C.) (citing Big M on the
question of invalid purpose, but upholding a statutory provision — enacted following a bitter
labour strike — that disqualified school board employees from running for office as school
trustees).
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III. SECTION 2(B): A LEGACY OF LIMITS
Section 2(b) leads the Charter’s fundamental freedoms, generating a volume of
more than 80 decisions and outpacing its companion guarantees by a substantial
margin. Though poised to play a pivotal role, showing other guarantees the way,
section 2(b)’s promise did not materialize. Despite enforcing the entitlement a
number of times over the years, the Court’s ambivalence toward expressive freedom
dates from its landmark decision in Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General).34
There, the Court dealt section 2(b) a blow from which it has not recovered.
Subsequently and throughout, the jurisprudence has been preoccupied with the
content of expression and whether expressive activity is deserving of Charter
protection. Using a standard of worthiness to determine that issue misconceives the
guarantee’s central purpose of treating all content as free, whether valuable or not.
In this, the jurisprudence either forgot or missed the essential point that section 2(b)
protects freedom, not expression or its content. After all, that is the baseline
principle of section 2’s fundamental freedoms: it is freedom itself, and not a
particular religion, expressive activity or association that is protected. Under section
2(b), then, freedom is the principle and limits on content the exception. While
content can be limited, the distinction between expressive freedom and its
expressive content is critical.
In the early years, the Court developed frameworks for interpreting the Charter’s
rights and freedoms and though section 2(b) was little different, addressing that
challenge in Irwin Toy was unwise. Once Ford granted commercial expression status
under the Charter, it was unnecessary for the Court to prescribe a framework for
section 2(b) in Irwin Toy.35 Only a few months later, Irwin Toy would bear little
resemblance to the Court’s Bill 101 decisions, which applied a strict section 1
standard and boldly invalidated legislation of surpassing political and symbolic
importance in Quebec. Fortuity was partly to blame for an inauspicious start that
embedded misunderstandings in the section 2(b) jurisprudence.36 A companion case
34 [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Irwin Toy”] was
predated by other decisions but is s. 2(b)’s landmark because it defined freedom and proposed
a methodology for s. 2(b). See Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] S.C.J. No. 88,
[1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 (S.C.C.) and Devine v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] S.C.J. No. 89,
[1988] 2 S.C.R. 790 (S.C.C.); Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 580 v.
Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. 75, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 (S.C.C.); and British
Columbia Government Employees’ Union v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1988]
S.C.J. No. 76, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 214 (S.C.C.).
35 The decision in Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] S.C.J. No. 88, [1988] 2
S.C.R. 712 (S.C.C.) to grant Charter status to commercial expression under s. 2(b) applied to
the children’s advertising at issue in Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989]
S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 (S.C.C.).
36 For an account of the circumstances surrounding these threshold s. 2(b) cases, see
Jamie Cameron, “To the Rescue: Antonio Lamer and the Section 2(b) Cases from Quebec”
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to Ford and Devine, the decision in Irwin Toy was postponed because of internal
problems at the Court and, in the interim, Quebec invoked section 33, the override
clause, against the Bill 101 decisions.37 At a difficult moment, Lamer J. picked up
Le Dain J.’s unfinished draft in Irwin Toy and cobbled a majority opinion joined by
only three members of the Court.38 In the face of those challenges, the Court should
have left section 2(b)’s “landmark” interpretation to another day and been content to
decide the case narrowly, and on its merits.
In contrast to Big M, which set out a straightforward and compelling definition of
freedom, Irwin Toy’s primary rule of content neutrality was marred by equivocation.
Irwin Toy initially set a low threshold for entitlement, stating that any attempt to
convey meaning is expression and prima facie protected by section 2(b).39 That
standard reflected a value-neutral approach that is inclusive of expressive content,
regardless how objectionable.40 At a time when the scope of section 2(b) was
uncertain, the decision to embrace content neutrality marked a bold and significant
step. Had Irwin Toy stopped there, section 2(b)’s evolution might have looked quite
different. Either because of the confusion surrounding decision-making — an
instance of “too much collaboration and not enough leadership” — or because the
judges did not sufficiently trust it, the majority opinion went on to graft exceptions
in Adam Dodek & Daniel Jutras, eds., Le feu sacré : l’héritage d’Antonio Lamer/The Sacred
Fire: The Legacy of Antonio Lamer (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2009) 237
(explaining how internal difficulties brought the Court to the brink of losing quorum and
being unable to decide the s. 2(b) trilogy from Quebec). The details are drawn, primarily,
from Robert Sharpe & Kent Roach, Brian Dickson: A Judge’s Journey (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 2003), at 423-38.
37 Internally, the Court was in a state of “disarray”; Estey J. unceremoniously quit in the
spring of 1988; Le Dain J. was hospitalized that summer; Beetz J. had been diagnosed with
cancer; and McIntyre J. was anxious to retire. The decision in Irwin Toy was sidelined to
prioritize the intensely controversial Bill 101 cases: Jamie Cameron, “To the Rescue: Antonio
Lamer and the Section 2(b) Cases from Quebec” in Adam Dodek & Daniel Jutras, eds., Le
feu sacré : l’héritage d’Antonio Lamer/The Sacred Fire: The Legacy of Antonio Lamer
(Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2009) 237, at 242.
38 Irwin Toy was decided by a panel of five judges. Though sometimes attributed to
Dickson C.J.C., the majority opinion was presented in all three names — the Chief Justice and
Lamer and Wilson JJ. (see Cameron, ibid., at 249-50, explaining the difficulties that arose in
converting Le Dain J.’s unfinished draft and proposing an approach that was agreeable to
Dickson C.J.C. and Wilson J.).
39 Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R.
927, at 969 (S.C.C.).
40 Notably, the Court stated that freedom of expression was entrenched so that “everyone
can manifest their thoughts, opinions, beliefs, indeed all expressions of the heart and mind,
however unpopular, distasteful or contrary to the mainstream”: Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec
(Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, at 968 (S.C.C.). Without
providing a definition, the Court excluded “violent forms of expression” from s. 2(b) (at 970).
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and an incongruous purpose-effect test onto its low threshold of entitlement.41
These caveats and add-ons have done more to obscure section 2(b)’s conception
of freedom than to narrow the guarantee. Although set in a cluttered analytical
framework, Irwin Toy’s prima facie test withstood the test of time. Meanwhile, and
though of limited doctrinal influence, the purpose-effect test is problematic because
it modelled how section 2(b)’s values could be re-purposed to limit the scope of
freedom.42
The addition of this test was a critical step in section 2(b)’s interpretation because
it generated a content-based, double standard of breach. Though adapted from Big
M, the doctrine took an unusual turn under section 2(b).43 The wrinkle in Irwin Toy
was that while purposeful infringements of expression would proceed directly to
section 1, non-purposeful interferences merely affecting expressive freedom faced a
further burden. Under that branch of the test, section 2(b) was not engaged unless
expressive activity advanced the guarantee’s underlying values: the pursuit of truth,
participation in social and political decision-making, and individual self-
fulfilment.44 Put simply, the analysis of impermissible effects on expressive freedom
was overtly content-based, limiting the guarantee to putatively “valuable” expres-
sion and imposing a burden on claimants to demonstrate the worthiness of
expressive activity. As such, this construct set up an overt contradiction between a
values-based test and content neutrality that resurfaced under section 1, where it
took the form of the contextual approach. That is when section 2(b)’s underlying
values began playing a key role in justifying limits on expressive freedom. Irwin Toy
41 Jamie Cameron, “To the Rescue: Antonio Lamer and the Section 2(b) Cases from
Quebec” in Adam Dodek & Daniel Jutras, eds., Le feu sacré : l’héritage d’Antonio
Lamer/The Sacred Fire: The Legacy of Antonio Lamer (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada,
2009) 237, at 250.
42 But see R. v. Khawaja, [2012] S.C.J. No. 69, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 555 (S.C.C.) (applying
the purpose-effect test in the setting of anti-terrorism legislation); Montréal (City) v.
2952-1366 Québec Inc., [2005] S.C.J. No. 63, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 141, at para. 74 (S.C.C.)
(introducing a test that uses s. 2(b)’s underlying values to determine access to government
property for expressive purposes); see also Ontario (Public Safety and Security) v. Criminal
Lawyers’ Assn., [2010] S.C.J. No. 23, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 815, at para. 31 (S.C.C.) (stating that
s. 2(b) only protects a right of access to documents that are “necessary to permit meaningful
discussion on a matter of public importance”).
43 Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R.
927, at 972 (S.C.C.) (stating that “[t]he importance of focussing . . . on the purpose and
effect of the legislation is nowhere more clearly stated than in R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.”);
see also R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 331-32
(S.C.C.) (stating that both purpose and effect are relevant in determining constitutionality).
44 Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R.
927, at 976 (S.C.C.) (stating, at 977, that a claimant must show that “her aim was to convey
a meaning reflective of the principles underlying freedom of expression”). See also 978-79
(providing a summary and conclusion of the two steps in the purpose-effect test).
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facilitated that development by taking an important intermediate step that expressly
lowered the standard of justification under section 1.
After proposing an analytical framework under section 2(b), Irwin Toy adjusted
the section 1 analysis, modifying the Oakes test to create a double standard of
justification.45 Under that approach, a strict standard of justification applies when
the state acts as the “antagonist” of an individual, but deference is sufficient when
the legislature “mediates the competing claims of different groups in the commu-
nity”, allocating scarce resources or protecting the vulnerable.46 A “reasonable
assessment” of competing claims would be enough, under that standard, to justify a
violation of section 2(b).47 Invoked episodically, Irwin Toy’s section 1 dichotomy
has had limited influence. Less obviously a content-based doctrine, in the moment
it enabled the Court to uphold restrictions on children’s advertising and avoid
provoking Quebec to rely on the override a second time, in quick succession after
the Bill 101 cases.48
Irwin Toy set section 2(b) on a course that increasingly misapprehended the
guarantee by focusing on the content, rather than the freedom, of expression. Within
a year, its dichotomy of strict-deferential section 1 review was overtaken by an
alternative methodology — the contextual approach — which offered an unprin-
cipled but effective way to place limits on expressive activity. Inspired by Justice
Wilson’s concurring opinion in Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), the
appeal to context was grounded in her observation that competing interests cannot
be balanced in the abstract.49 She sought a way to align comparables, matching the
45 In this, the Court focused its attention on minimal impairment, stating that what it
requires will vary, depending on “the government objective and on the means available to
achieve it”: Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1
S.C.R. 927, at 993 (S.C.C.).
46 Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R.
927, at 990, 993-94 (S.C.C.) (proposing and explaining the rationale for using these variables
to bifurcate the s. 1 standard of review).
47 Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R.
927, at 990 (S.C.C.).
48 Between the Bill 101 cases and Irwin Toy, the s. 1 test changed dramatically, and there
is much to suggest that the three Quebec cases would or should have been decided the same
way under Ford’s s. 1 standard: see Jamie Cameron, “To the Rescue: Antonio Lamer and the
Section 2(b) Cases from Quebec” in Adam Dodek & Daniel Jutras, eds., Le feu sacré :
l’héritage d’Antonio Lamer/The Sacred Fire: The Legacy of Antonio Lamer (Markham, ON:
LexisNexis Canada, 2009) 237, at 253, 248.
49 See Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 124, [1989] 2
S.C.R. 1326, at 1353-56 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Edmonton Journal”] (concurring opinion,
stating that the majority opinion put more weight on expressive freedom “at large” than is
“appropriate in the context of the case”). Her intense dissatisfaction with the Labour Trilogy
was the genesis and inspiration of Wilson J.’s contextual approach. See Jamie Cameron,
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context or content of expression with the context or goal of regulation.50 Imagining
how the Oakes test could accommodate that objective was not easy, because there
was no obvious place in its abstract framework for facts, circumstances and
“context” to enter the calculus.51
Though the contextual approach offered a solution to the dilemma of an overly
abstract conception of rights, it assumed a form under section 2(b) that undermined
a principled conception of freedom. There, it provided the rationale for a
methodology that appropriated section 2(b)’s underlying values and moved them
across the structural divide from section 2(b) to section 1, where the entitlement’s
values were co-opted against expressive freedom. Justice Wilson’s declaration that
a “particular right or freedom may have a different value depending on the
context”52 was developed in Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario.
There, McLachlin J. stated, for a majority, that some restrictions are easier to justify
than others, because “not all expression is equally worthy of protection” and “[n]or
are all infringements . . . equally serious”.53 First incorporated into section 1 by R.
v. Keegstra and then dominant in the evolution of section 2(b), context was the
proxy for an outcome-based approach that focused on value, not harm, in
determining limits.54
In practice, the contextual approach invited the Court to assess expressive activity
“Justice in Her Own Right: Bertha Wilson and the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms” in Jamie Cameron, ed., Reflections on the Legacy of Justice Bertha Wilson
(Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2008), at 399-405.
50 Her idea of context would “bring into sharp relief” the aspect of s. 2(b) “truly at stake”,
as well as the relevant aspects of any competing values: Edmonton Journal v. Alberta
(Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 124, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326, at 1355-56 (S.C.C.).
51 Early on, the final step in the proportionality test played little or no role in the s. 1
analysis. Much later, that step became the doctrinal focus for a balancing of interests that is
contextual, or particular to the interests at stake. Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson
Colony, [2009] S.C.J. No. 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567 (S.C.C.) (enhancing the salutary benefits
and deleterious consequences test as an analytical venue for juxtaposing and balancing
competing interests).
52 Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 124, [1989] 2
S.C.R. 1326, at 1355 (S.C.C.).
53 [1990] 2 S.C.R. 232, at 247 (S.C.C.).
54 R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, at 726, 737, 759-67
(S.C.C.) (stating that s. 2(b)’s values come “to the forefront” under s. 1, approving the
contextual approach, and proposing a methodology to compare the “expression at stake” to
“free expression values”). Though the Chief Justice and Wilson J. concurred in Irwin Toy’s
singular antagonist model for Charter issues arising in the criminal justice system, both joined
the application of a contextual approach, with a lowered standard of justification, in Keegstra
(at 765) (concluding that the hate speech at stake was only tenuously connected to s. 2(b)’s
values and warranted less protection under s. 1 as a result). See generally Jamie Cameron,
“The Past, Present, and Future of Expressive Freedom under the Charter” (1997) 35 O.H.L.J.
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and designate content as “low value” when it was deemed to stray from section 2’s
core.55 This approach meant that difficult content, like sexually explicit, defamatory
or discriminatory expression, and some advertising, fell short of section 2(b)’s
aspirational values, deserved little or no protection under section 1, and could be
limited under a relaxed standard of justification.56 That, in brief, is how the
contextual approach substituted a subjective assessment of expression’s value for an
evidentiary threshold of harm. In that process, values aimed at informing a generous
definition of freedom were re-purposed to discount section 2(b)’s guarantee of
expressive freedom.57 Once the Court found that the expression at stake was low
value, the severity of the violation mattered less and played little or no role in the
analysis.58
Not only were section 2(b)’s underlying values subverted, roles were reversed.
While a focus on expressive value imposed an effective burden on the rights holder
under section 1, the Court relied on proxies like common sense and experience to
link a perception that expressive content is valueless to an assumption that it is also
2, at 7-27 (explaining and critiquing the contextual approach, as introduced in Keegstra and
applied in the s. 2(b) jurisprudence).
55 Examples include R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (S.C.C.);
Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, [1990] S.C.J. No. 129, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892
(S.C.C.) (federal human rights legislation); Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15,
[1996] S.C.J. No. 40, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825 (S.C.C.) (extracurricular expressive activity of a
schoolteacher); RJR-Macdonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] S.C.J. No. 68,
[1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 (S.C.C.), per La Forest J., dissenting (tobacco advertising); Hill v.
Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] S.C.J. No. 64, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 (S.C.C.)
(common law of defamation); and R. v. Lucas, [1998] S.C.J. No. 28, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 439
(S.C.C.) (defamatory libel).
56 See, e.g., R. v. Butler, [1992] S.C.J. No. 15, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, at 496-497, 500
(S.C.C.) (declaring that sexually explicit materials “seriously offend the values fundamental
to our society” and do not “stand on an equal footing with other kinds of expression which
directly engage the ‘core’ of the freedom of expression”).
57 In RJR-Macdonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] S.C.J. No. 68, [1995] 3
S.C.R. 199, at 282-83 (S.C.C.), for example, La Forest J. declared that tobacco advertising
was as far from s. 2(b)’s core as prostitution, hate mongering and pornography, and should
only receive “a very low degree of protection” under s. 1. In R. v. Lucas, [1998] S.C.J. No.
28, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 439, at paras. 93-94 (S.C.C.), Cory J. described defamatory statements
as “inimical” to s. 2(b)’s core values, adding that it would “trivialize the magnificent panoply”
of rights guaranteed by the Charter to attach significant value to such content; in his view,
defamatory libel should receive no more than “scant protection” under s. 1.
58 A low-value designation influenced the proportionality analysis — where the severity
of the violation must be considered — because the salutary benefits of achieving the
regulatory goal could easily outweigh the deleterious consequences of prohibiting valueless
expression.
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harmful.59 Furthermore, the Court has routinely assumed that prohibitions on
expressive activity represent a considered legislative response to a “reasoned
apprehension” of harm.60
Over time, the contextual approach relegated section 2(b)’s prima facie test to a
pro forma role and elevated the analysis of limits under section 1. Section 2(b)’s
values shifted in function from protecting the entitlement to justifying limits on
expression. As a result, the methodology is disproportionately weighted to the
question of limits and is seriously out of balance. Unlike Big M, which focused
exclusively on entitlement at the expense of justification, the jurisprudence on
expressive freedom is almost the opposite: Irwin Toy’s egalitarian concept of
entitlement catalyzed an approach that glossed the violation and placed the weight
of analysis almost exclusively on the section 1 question.61
Paradoxically, the contextual approach did not solve the problem of avoiding
uneven comparators between the abstract and the particular. To the contrary, it
perpetuated the anomaly. In Edmonton Journal, Justice Wilson worried that
abstracting expressive freedom’s values would privilege or advantage section 2(b) in
any analysis of competing interests, at the expense of regulatory objectives. The
approach she suggested was aimed at achieving a balance, by juxtaposing the
context of the entitlement and the state’s interest in imposing limits. The contextual
approach created a new imbalance, using abstract values to marginalize expressive
content and lower its protection under s.1.
The section 2(b) jurisprudence confirms that freedom cannot prevail under a
methodology that tests the context or content of expression against abstract and
aspirational values. Robust concern for section 2(b)’s freedom principle is rare and
that, when found, it often takes the form of dissent.62 An example is McIntyre J.’s
59 See, e.g., Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott, [2013] S.C.J. No.
11, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 467, at paras. 132, 135 (S.C.C.) (stating that a court is entitled to use
“common sense and experience” in recognizing that certain activities, such as hate speech,
inflict “societal harms”, adding that the discriminatory effects of hate speech are “part of the
everyday knowledge and experience of Canadians”).
60 R. v. Butler, [1992] S.C.J. No. 15, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (S.C.C.) (introducing this
standard); see also Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 28, [2004] 1
S.C.R. 827, at paras. 77-78 (S.C.C.) (stating, in the context of “high-value” election campaign
expression, that when faced with inconclusive evidence the court may rely on a “reasoned
apprehension” of the harm); Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott, [2013]
S.C.J. No. 11, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 467, at para. 135 (S.C.C.) (stating that the legislature was
entitled to act on a “reasonable apprehension of societal harm” arising from hate speech).
61 Note that s. 2(b) excludes expressive activity that is a form of violence and that the
purpose-effect test is occasionally applied; Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General),
[1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 (S.C.C.). In addition, the Court set a threshold
under s. 2(b) for access to government property and information; see note 41, supra.
62 See, e.g., Montréal (City) v. 2952-1366 Québec Inc., [2005] S.C.J. No. 63, [2005] 3
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dissent in Irwin Toy. There, he sounded an early warning, presciently cautioning
against even “a small abandonment of a principle of vital importance” and
admonishing that “[w]e should not lightly take a step in that direction, even a small
one”.63 In principle, McIntyre J. would require “urgent and compelling reasons” to
limit expressive freedom, and then only for the time and extent necessary to protect
the community.64
Despite its origins and weakness as precedent, the Court’s conception of section
2(b) in Irwin Toy has endured. In the circumstances, it was a mistake to propose a
methodology, and fundamental flaws in the jurisprudence can be traced to this
landmark.65 As section 2(b)’s counterpart to Big M’s definition of freedom, the
principle of content neutrality failed — except superficially — to anchor or guide
the jurisprudence. The Court rendered that principle meaningless, garbling it and
diverting values that promote the scope of freedom to the contrary objective of
justifying limits on expression. By treating abstract values as a test of merit under
section 2(b), Irwin Toy’s purpose-effect test was the forerunner of the contextual
approach, which assumed a similar and determinative role under section 1.
Decided in 1989, Irwin Toy was predated by the Alberta Reference, which formed
part of the Court’s landmark on section 2(d), the Labour Trilogy.66 Albeit over
Dickson C.J.C.’s influential dissent, this landmark also failed the guarantee. Not
only did the Court reject labour’s bid to constitutionalize collective bargaining and
the right to strike, for years it was unable even to agree on a concept of associational
freedom.
S.C.R. 141 (S.C.C.) (per Binnie J., dissenting against a by-law’s application to a strip club
and insisting that it be re-enacted to comply with the Charter); Baier v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J.
No. 31, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 673 (S.C.C.) (per Fish J., in dissent, invalidating a statutory
disqualification from office, in part because the measure was enacted shortly after a bitter
labour dispute and was aimed at excluding school board employees from running for office
as trustees).
63 Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R.
927, at 1008 (S.C.C.).
64 Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R.
927, at 1009 (S.C.C.).
65 Critiques include Robin Elliott, “Back to Basics: A Critical Look at the Irwin Toy
Framework for Freedom of Expression” (2011) 15 Rev. Const. Stud. 205; Chanakya Sethi,
“Beyond Irwin Toy: A New Approach to Freedom of Expression under the Charter” (2012)
17 Appeal 21; Jamie Cameron, “The Original Conception of Section 1 and its Demise: A
Comment on Irwin Toy v. Attorney General of Quebec” (1989) 35 McGill L.J. 253.
66 The “Labour Trilogy”: Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alberta),
[1987] S.C.J. No. 10, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 (S.C.C.); Public Service Alliance Canada v.
Canada, [1987] S.C.J. No. 9, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424 (S.C.C.); Retail, Wholesale and
Department Store Union v. Saskatchewan, [1987] S.C.J. No. 8, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460 (S.C.C.).
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IV. SECTION 2(D)’S ANOMALOUS LEGACY
Even before Irwin Toy, the Labour Trilogy damaged section 2(d)’s prospects,
marginalizing freedom of association to the point of insignificance in section 2’s
family of fundamental freedoms. Part of the problem was that association did not fit
the model of individual rights, and a collective entitlement of potentially indeter-
minate reach posed an unfamiliar and puzzling challenge for the Court. Whether and
to what extent labour relations should be constitutionalized was the overlay that
dominated and complicated section 2(d)’s development.
After many years, the guarantee’s prospects brightened and associational freedom
has to some extent recovered. For the most part, section 2(d)’s comeback has yet
more emphatically reinforced its destiny as a mechanism for advancing labour union
objectives.67 In this, section 2(d) is anomalous, effectively serving as a dedicated or
single-purpose entitlement. The Court may not have set out to dampen the
guarantee, but has done little to encourage an inclusive conception of associational
freedom. To this day, section 2(d) has little presence outside the context of labour
relations, in large part, because the Court failed to cultivate section 2(d)’s
development in other settings.68 The guarantee’s anomalous evolution matters
especially in this discussion for its impact on the freedom from association, or
non-association.
Following Big M, freedom from coercion and forms of compulsion should have
been a cornerstone in the section 2 jurisprudence. Once labour issues were welded
onto section 2(d), freedom from coerced association could not succeed, because the
Court was unwilling to tolerate asymmetry between negative and positive elements
of the entitlement. The Labour Trilogy’s rejection of collective bargaining and the
right to strike was a monumental loss for labour, and to some it confirmed the
Charter’s proclivity for reinforcing, rather than redressing, social and economic
advantage. Perhaps realizing that rejecting other claims could forestall further
67 Section 2(d)’s comeback began with Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001]
S.C.J. No. 87, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016 (S.C.C.) and continued to 2015, when the Court
overruled precedent that rejected labour union claims, in Mounted Police Assn. of Ontario v.
Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 1, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.); and
Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v. Saskatchewan, [2015] S.C.J. No. 4, [2015] 1 S.C.R.
245 (S.C.C.).
68 The claim failed in Black v. Law Society of Alberta, [1989] S.C.J. No. 27, [1989] 1
S.C.R. 591 (S.C.C.) (professional regulation); R. v. Skinner, [1990] S.C.J. No. 51, [1990] 1
S.C.R. 1235 (S.C.C.) (soliciting prostitution); Canadian Egg Marketing Agency v. Richard-
son, [1998] S.C.J. No. 78, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 157 (S.C.C.) (marketing regulation); and Suresh
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] S.C.J. No. 3, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3
(S.C.C.) (deportation). It succeeded in Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1997] S.C.J.
No. 85, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569, at paras. 36, 37 (S.C.C.) (discussing the breach of associational
freedom in the context of referendum campaigns); and was referenced in Trinity Western
University v. British Columbia College of Teachers, [2001] S.C.J. No. 32, [2001] 1 S.C.R.
772 (S.C.C.) (professional accreditation).
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criticism, the Court in Black v. Law Society of Alberta deflected a claim clearly
grounded in section 2(d) to section 6 mobility rights.69 The question there was
whether law society regulations could deter and prevent the rise of interprovincial
law firms. Resolving the claim under section 6 avoided a section 2(d) win for
lawyers and law firms not long after the Labour Trilogy had rejected the claims of
labour unions. In much the same way, the Court maintained symmetry between
association and non-association by resisting a concept of freedom from compelled
association with labour unions and their activities.
A decisive moment arose in the 1990s when union authority was challenged under
section 2(d). The question in Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union
was whether applying mandatory dues to objectionable non-workplace causes
violated the Charter rights of a non-union member.70 Three members of a
fragmented seven-member panel rejected non-association as definitionally incon-
sistent with a guarantee of associational freedom.71 From that perspective, associa-
tional freedom was one-dimensional and could only be conceptualized as a
“positive” entitlement. A fourth member of the panel also expressed skepticism of
non-association, but addressed the question of breach, proposing an onerous
standard based on a concept of “forced ideological conformity”.72 All told, a
majority in Lavigne either rejected or voiced considerable resistance toward a
concept of freedom from compelled association.73 In addition, all members of the
panel rejected freedom from compelled expression under section 2(b).74
69 [1989] S.C.J. No. 27, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 591 (S.C.C.). Justices McIntyre and L’Heureux-
Dubé concluded that law society regulations prohibiting resident lawyers from associating
professionally with non-resident lawyers and firms did not engage s. 6 mobility rights, and
were instead a violation of s. 2(d).
70 [1991] S.C.J. No. 52, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lavigne”]. The
Charter applied because the statutory framework for community colleges authorized
mandatory dues check off.
71 Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [1991] S.C.J. No. 52, [1991] 2
S.C.R. 211, at 249-63 (S.C.C.) (per Wilson J., L’Heureux Dubé and Cory JJ. concurring,
stating that Lavigne’s “right to freely” associate was not infringed because he was not
prevented from forming or joining associations of his choosing: at 263).
72 Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [1991] S.C.J. No. 52, [1991] 2
S.C.R. 211, at 342-51 (S.C.C.) (stating that Lavigne’s union dues did not “bring him into
association” with ideas and values to which he did not subscribe: at 342).
73 The plurality opinion by La Forest J. cited R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J.
No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.) and adopted a bilateral concept of s. 2(d) but upheld the
limit under s. 1.
74 The s. 2(b) claim foundered because union dues did not count as a form of expression,
and paying dues did not publicly identify Lavigne with objectionable causes or prevent him
from disavowing those causes. Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [1991]
S.C.J. No. 52, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211, at 340, 279 (S.C.C.) (per La Forest J. and Wilson J.,
respectively).
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Lavigne marked a serious setback, not only for section 2(d), but for section 2 as
well. Reviewing it again reveals how protective the Court was of union hegemony
and how that, in turn, impelled an outcome-oriented and formalistic response to the
question of non-association. Those who rejected compulsion under section 2(d)
maintained, for example, that valid claims could be absorbed by other Charter
guarantees.75 In other words, it was permissible to read section 2(d) down because
other guarantees could step in and fill any gaps on issues of compelled association.
Nor did inconsistency seem to trouble the Court. While promoting section 2(d) as
a positive entitlement with little or no scope for freedom from association, it styled
section 2(b) the other way, as a negative entitlement with limited potential as a
positive right.76 These analytical anomalies make it difficult to resist the conclusion
that non-association was excluded from section 2(d) to pre-empt Charter-based
challenges to union authority.
Following Lavigne, the Court’s departure from principle would only deepen in R.
v. Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd., which tested a statutory provision compelling
union membership as a precondition to employment in Quebec’s construction
industry.77 On any view, compelling union membership was a more profound
violation of freedom than deflecting a fractional portion of mandatory dues to
objectionable, off-site causes.78 As in Big M, the scheme entailed concurrent
violations, both constraining access to employment and compelling construction
workers to join one of five province-approved unions as a prerequisite to work.79
The Court upheld both provisions, albeit over a dissent that powerfully maintained
that the freedom not to associate was “markedly infringed” by a system of “forced
75 Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [1991] S.C.J. No. 52, [1991] 2
S.C.R. 211, at 263 (S.C.C.), per Wilson J.
76 See Haig v. Canada (Chief Electoral Offıcer), [1993] S.C.J. No. 84, [1993] 2 S.C.R.
995, at 1034, 1039 (S.C.C.) (characterizing s. 2(b) as a negative entitlement and acknowl-
edging the possibility of a positive entitlement in “the proper context”); Native Women’s
Assn. of Canada v. Canada, [1994] S.C.J. No. 93, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 627, at 655 (S.C.C.)
(confirming that s. 2(b) is a negative entitlement, without ruling out the “possibility” that
positive governmental action might be required in some circumstances to make expressive
freedom meaningful).
77 [2001] S.C.J. No. 68, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 209 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Advance Cutting”].
78 R. v. Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd., [2001] S.C.J. No. 68, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 209, at
para. 32 (S.C.C.), per Bastarache J., dissenting.
79 Not only was union membership mandatory in Quebec’s construction industry, the
scheme included a variety of constraints on the right to join one of the province’s prescribed
construction unions. R. v. Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd., [2001] S.C.J. No. 68, [2001] 3
S.C.R. 209, at para. 42 (S.C.C.). In dissent, Bastarache J. found both violations of s. 2(d)
unconstitutional.
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association and state control over work opportunity”.80
Despite differing on its application, both plurality opinions in Advance Cutting
focused on the concept of forced ideological coercion.81 On reflection, it is striking
how radically that standard departs from the approach in Big M, which recognized
indirect as well as direct or blatant forms of coercion. Under Lavigne and Advance
Cutting, the state can compel beliefs and actions up to the point of forced ideological
conformity, objectively understood.82 On its face, this standard grossly understates
the threat compulsion poses to freedom; in doing so, it diminished the content and
scope of section 2(d). Just as the claim in Big M would have failed under a doctrine
of forced ideological conformity, the non-association at stake in Lavigne and
Advance Cutting could have succeeded under Big M’s conception of coercion.
Section 2(d)’s non-association decisions also had implications for compulsion in
the larger frame of section 2’s fundamental freedoms. Apart from Big M, there is
little in the section 2 jurisprudence to deter governments from compelling
endorsement of or compliance with official political, religious and ideological
messages. Though non-association was addressed in a labour relations setting, the
courts have not been particularly receptive in other settings, acknowledging the
claim in a sprinkling of decisions and rejecting it in others.83 Seldom recognized or
80 R. v. Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd., [2001] S.C.J. No. 68, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 209, at
paras. 31, 34 (S.C.C.), per Bastarache J.
81 R. v. Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd., [2001] S.C.J. No. 68, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 209, at
para. 3 (S.C.C.) (per Bastarache J., proposing a “contextual” version of the standard) and
paras. 224-232 (taking an evidentiary approach to the concept of ideological coercion). Note
that Iacobucci J. (see paras. 283-289), concurring alone, preferred the more liberal approach
to compelled association that was proposed by La Forest J. in Lavigne v. Ontario Public
Service Employees Union, [1991] S.C.J. No. 52, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211 (S.C.C.).
82 Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [1991] S.C.J. No. 52, [1991] 2
S.C.R. 211, at 344 (S.C.C.) (per McLachlin J., stating that the standard is objective, and asks
whether the compulsion is reasonably regarded as a form of association with values and ideas
to which an individual does not subscribe).
83 In addition to RJR-Macdonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] S.C.J. No. 68,
[1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 (S.C.C.) and Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1997] S.C.J. No. 85,
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 569 (S.C.C.), the Court was sensitive under s. 2(a) to the prospect that
religious officials could by law be compelled to violate their beliefs in Reference re Same-Sex
Marriage, [2004] S.C.J. No. 75, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698 (S.C.C.). Provincial appellate courts
have rejected freedom from compulsion in significant decisions, including McAteer v.
Canada (Attorney General), [2014] O.J. No. 3728, 2014 ONCA 578 (Ont. C.A.) (concluding
that a mandatory oath to the Queen, as a condition of citizenship eligibility, did not violate
any of s. 2’s guarantees); Re Saskatchewan (Marriage Act, Marriage Commissioners), [2011]
S.J. No. 3, 2011 SKCA 3, 327 D.L.R. (4th) 669 (Sask. C.A.) (concluding that providing
services for same-sex marriage would not violate the Charter rights of marriage commissioners);
and Christian Medical and Dental Society of Canada v. College of Physicians and Surgeons,
[2019] O.J. No. 2515, 2019 ONCA 393 (Ont. C.A.) (finding that mandatory referrals of
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remembered is Big M’s insight that forms of mandatory affirmation, observance or
endorsement are a profound affront that may be more intrusive of freedom than
prohibiting an activity. Big M notwithstanding, freedom from association has
languished in a jurisprudence that failed to develop conceptual or doctrinal empathy
for those who are compelled to adopt, voice or comply with state-prescribed
messages.
With coercive measures seemingly on the rise, the relatively low status of
freedom from compulsion represents a concerning deficit in the section 2 jurispru-
dence that is timely and matters greatly. Recent examples include mandatory gas
pump stickers compelling gas station owners in Ontario to carry the Ontario
government’s partisan message about carbon taxes, as well as mandatory free speech
policies at colleges and universities in Ontario and Alberta, compelling compliance
with the state’s conception of free speech on campus.84 On other frontiers of
compulsion, intense controversy arose from mandatory attestations under the federal
government’s 2017 Canada Summer Jobs program and the Law Society of Ontario’s
mandatory declaration of Statement of Principles.85 Most egregious is Quebec’s Bill
21, because it constitutes a compulsion of identity, coercing members of the
democratic community to comply, publicly, with a prescribed policy of state
secularity. Though it is a more profound violation than Sunday store hours in Big M,
it is unclear whether Bill 21’s compulsion of identity would satisfy the Court’s
exacting standard of forced ideological conformity.86
There is another, profound consequence of section 2(d)’s capture by labour union
interests. Its perceived exclusivity as a labour entitlement has isolated the guarantee,
services that are religiously objectionable violated s. 2(a) but were justifiable under s. 1 of the
Charter).
84 See Federal Carbon Tax Transparency Act, S.O. 2019, c. 7, Sched. 23 (mandatory gas
pump stickers); Office of the Premier, “Upholding Free Speech on Ontario’s University and
College Campuses” (August 30, 2018) (government directive on campus free speech), online:
Government of Ontario News <https://news.ontario.ca/opo/en/2018/08/upholding-free-speech-
on-ontarios-university-and-college-campuses.html​>. See also see Jamie Cameron, “Compel-
ling Freedom on Campus: A Free Speech Paradox” (2020) 29:2 Const. Forum Const. 5 (also
discussing a similar government policy on campus free speech in the province of Alberta).
85 On Canada Summer Jobs, see generally Brian Bird, “Canada Summer Jobs and the
Charter problem” Policy Options (January 16, 2018), online: <https://policyoptions.irpp.org/
magazines/january-2018/canada-summer-jobs-and-the-charter-problem/ ​>. The Law Society
of Ontario’s Statement of Principles generated controversy and a voluble commentary and
was repealed in September 2019. See Jacques Gallant, “Law Society scraps key diversity
initiative” The Toronto Star (September 11, 2019), online: <https://www.thestar.com/news/
gta/2019/09/11/law-society-scraps-key-diversity-initiative.html ​>.
86 As noted, Bill 21, An Act respecting the laicity of the State, 1st Sess., 42d Leg., Quebec,
2019 (assented to June 16, 2019), S.Q. 2019, c. 12, is protected by the override from
challenge under most provisions of the Charter, though not s. 28’s guarantee of gender
equality, notwithstanding anything in the Act.
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preventing or deterring connections between associational freedom and freedom of
religion and expression. There, as well, the jurisprudence missed an important
opportunity to build a bridge across section 2’s guarantees. Justice Le Dain’s
plurality opinion in the Alberta Reference proposed the narrowest conception of
associational freedom, but recognized that a violation of section 2(d) can occur in
concert with a breach of other section 2 guarantees.87 That insight opened up a line
of communication between the guarantees that was at least latent in Big M’s
recognition of the inherently collective and associational nature of religious belief
and practice.88 Had it not been so decisively dedicated to union issues, section 2(d)
could have played a vital role in forging links between section 2’s guarantees and
contributing, in that process, to an overarching conception of freedom.
Instead, there is little sense of connection between guarantees in the section 2
jurisprudence. Though a violation that engages two or even three of section 2’s
guarantees aggravates the breach, the Court rarely addresses compound infringe-
ments. In 2001, Trinity Western University v. British Columbia College of Teachers
addressed a trifecta of violations, but the Court refused to do so in R. v. Khawaja,
and again in Law Society of British Columbia v. Trinity Western University.89 There
and in Trinity Western University v. Law Society of Upper Canada, the Court upheld
law society non-accreditation of a proposed law school with a religiously based
covenant that applied to all students on campus.90 The Court had a critical
opportunity to recognize a compound violation of section 2 and act on the renewed
conception of associational freedom introduced in Mounted Police Assn. of Ontario
v. Canada (Attorney General).91 Writing on her own, then Chief Justice McLachlin
87 Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alberta), [1987] S.C.J. No. 10,
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, at para. 141 (S.C.C.) (stating that freedom of association is “particularly
important for the exercise of other fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of expression and
freedom of conscience and religion”, which “afford a wide scope for protected activity in
association”).
88 At the least, Big M’s recognition of the associational bonds of religious community
intuited the interface of s. 2’s guarantees.
89 See Trinity Western University v. British Columbia College of Teachers, [2001] S.C.J.
No. 32, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772 (S.C.C.) (treating freedom of religion as the primary claim and
acknowledging that associational and expressive freedoms were implicated in the College’s
refusal to approve the teacher training program). In R. v. Khawaja, [2012] S.C.J. No. 69,
[2012] 3 S.C.R. 555 (S.C.C.), the Court’s analysis of anti-terrorism legislation focused on s.
2(b) to the exclusion of ss. 2(a) and (d), which were also argued; in Law Society of British
Columbia v. Trinity Western University, [2018] S.C.J. No. 32, [2018] 2 S.C.R. 293 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Law Society of BC v. TWU”] (upholding the Law Society’s decision not to
accredit the proposed law school), the majority opinion dismissed associational and
expressive freedom).
90 [2018] S.C.J. No. 33, [2018] 2 S.C.R. 453 (S.C.C.) (companion case from Ontario).
91 [2015] S.C.J. No. 1, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mounted Police”]. See
discussion infra.
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stated that, though a separate analysis was not required, the Court must include
expressive and associational freedom “in the ambit” of section 2(a), because the
limits on those values flowed from the community’s religious beliefs.92 In
comparison, the majority opinion was dismissive, declaring that the factual matrix
of the claims was indistinguishable, and that section 2(a) was “sufficient” to account
for the expressive, associational and equality rights of the TWU community.93
Minimizing the severity of the violation in that way demonstrated a lack of insight
into the scope and severity of the breach and how it engaged section 2’s guarantees
as an integral whole.
Dual breaches of section 2 are more common, and the pattern there is mixed. At
times, the Court addresses both violations, but more often treats one as governing,
or deflects ancillary, subordinate infringements.94 In cautioning the Court against
deciding more than is minimally necessary, principles of adjudication can diminish
the significance and severity of compound violations. In addition, the practice
discourages the Court from treating section 2 as a composite or suite of guarantees,
collectively protecting freedoms that are fundamental alone and as an integral
whole.
From the outset, section 2(d)’s interpretation was entangled in labour issues and
indecision about individual and collective conceptions of association. Though it is
the only guarantee that has been reworked, the Court has not released section 2(d)’s
promise of associational freedom from the bonds of precedent. For instance, its first
decision overruling part of the Labour Trilogy and constitutionalizing collective
bargaining failed to acknowledge a role for section 2(d) outside that context.95
92 Law Society of British Columbia v. Trinity Western University, [2018] S.C.J. No. 32,
[2018] 2 S.C.R. 293, at paras. 122, 126 (S.C.C.).
93 Law Society of British Columbia v. Trinity Western University, [2018] S.C.J. No. 32,
[2018] 2 S.C.R. 293, at para. 77 (S.C.C.). The majority opinion also found that the denial of
law society accreditation was not a “serious limitation” of the s. 2(a) rights of community
members (at para. 102).
94 See Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott, [2013] S.C.J. No. 11,
[2013] 1 S.C.R. 467 (S.C.C.) (addressing ss. 2(b) and 2(a) claims); Libman v. Quebec
(Attorney General), [1997] S.C.J. No. 85, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569, at paras. 35-36 (S.C.C.)
(citing Le Dain J.’s opinion in the Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act
(Alberta), [1987] S.C.J. No. 10, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 (S.C.C.) and making a perfunctory
finding of breach under s. 2(d)); Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[2002] S.C.J. No. 3, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 100-111 (S.C.C.) (addressing ss. 2(b) and (d)
collectively, in the context of deportation proceedings against an individual allegedly
involved in an alleged terrorist organization).
95 Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British
Columbia, [2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391 (S.C.C.). See Jamie Cameron, “Due
Process, Collective Bargaining, and Section 2(d) of the Charter: A Comment on BC Health
Services” (2006-2007) 13 C.L.E.L.J. 323, at 352-61 (discussing the limits of the Court’s
conception of entitlement).
SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW
36
0024 [ST: 13] [ED: 100000] [REL: 98] Composed: Sat Aug 22 23:26:39 EDT 2020
XPP 9.3.1.0 SC_05905 nllp 8008
VER: [SC_05905-Local:09 Mar 20 11:49][MX-SECNDARY: 11 Aug 20 13:11][TT-: 02 Jul 20 09:46 loc=can unit=08008-ch0002] 0
While remaining fixed on labour issues, section 2(d)’s ongoing “renaissance” also
encouraged a wider conception of associational freedom. In Mounted Police,
McLachlin C.J.C. and Le Bel J. returned to section 2(d)’s roots, proposing a
purposive, generous and contextual approach — citing Big M — and suggesting
that the entitlement is not limited to labour issues.96 The Court’s intention to signal
a more generous interpretation nonetheless confirmed the deep-seated limits of its
conception. Not only did it celebrate the non-association decisions, Mounted Police
gestured toward a content-based standard of entitlement.97 As long as it resists or
excludes freedom from compelled association, section 2(d)’s scope of coverage will
be deficient and incomplete. Moreover, criteria that focuses on relative disadvantage
mistakes section 2(d)’s core purpose of protecting associational freedom from threat
by the state.98 As recent initiatives demonstrate, relative disadvantage is not the
issue when the state targets organizations and associations precisely because they
have the power to challenge or threaten government policies.99
Despite the renaissance, it remains unclear whether section 2(d) is more inclusive.
For the guarantee to be taken seriously, the Court must validate associational
freedom in non-labour cases, expressly acknowledge the threat posed by compelled
96 Mounted Police Assn. of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 1,
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 47-66 (S.C.C.).
97 Mounted Police Assn. of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 1,
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.), cited Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [1991]
S.C.J. No. 52, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211 (S.C.C.) and R. v. Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd., [2001]
S.C.J. No. 68, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 209 (S.C.C.) with approval, describing the decisions as models
of purposive interpretation. Mounted Police is a joint opinion by two justices who were on
different sides of the issue in Advance Cutting.
98 Mounted Police Assn. of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 1,
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 58-61 (S.C.C.) (focusing on marginalized and vulnerable groups,
stating that the purpose of s. 2(d) is to reduce, not enhance, social imbalances, and suggesting
a contextual approach to determine the constitutional status of associational freedom).
99 After 2012, the Canada Revenue Agency targeted a number of organizations for audit
that, coincidentally, had been critical of the Harper government and its policies; these
included the David Suzuki Foundation, Tides Canada, Equiterre, Environmental Defence,
Amnesty International, Physicians for Global Survival, and others engaged in the promotion
of social justice causes. These audits were suspended by the Liberal government in 2017;
Dean Beeby, “Political activity audits of charities suspended by Liberals” CBC News (May
4, 2017), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-revenue-agency-political-activity-
diane-lebouthillier-audits-panel-report-suspension-1.4099184​>. More recently, Alberta pre-
mier Jason Kenney announced a public inquiry into the finances of environmental organiza-
tions, including sources of foreign funding. In doing so, the premier spoke of a “premeditated,
internationally planned and financed operation to put Alberta energy out of business”; quoted
in Tyler Dawson, “Alberta announces public inquiry into ‘shadowy’ foreign funding of
environmental groups” National Post (July 4, 2019), online: <https://nationalpost.com/news/
politics/alberta-announces-public-inquiry-into-shadowy-foreign-funding-of-environmental-
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association, and activate section 2(d)’s role as a bond between section 2’s
guarantees.100
V. TOWARD A PRESCRIPTION FOR FREEDOM
With each guarantee generating its own issues and complexities, defining the
scope of section 2’s entitlements was an enormous challenge. Once landmarks were
in place, the Court was less inclined to revisit or build on the underlying core of
section 2’s guarantees. A definition of section 2(a)’s entitlement was not introduced
until 2004; in contrast to Big M, which made constant reference to freedom of
conscience and religion, the Court’s conception in Amselem was limited in scope to
elements of religious freedom, and either subsumed or disregarded the guarantee’s
express protection of conscientious freedom.101 As discussed, in recent years the
Court overruled its section 2(d) landmarks for the purpose of constitutionalizing
labour union entitlements. Meanwhile, and apart from occasional tweaks of the
contextual approach, the Court showed little interest in reconsidering its section 2(b)
methodology. For the most part, section 2(b)’s conception of freedom stayed the
course.
Section 2(b) lacks an analogue to Big M, and rarely has the Court attempted to
explain, philosophically and as a matter of principle, why expressive freedom
matters.102 For instance, it was never sufficient for Irwin Toy simply to recite section
2(b)’s well-known underlying values of self-governance, truth-seeking and indi-
vidual fulfilment.103 Rather than vitalize the guarantee, those values became a
100 See André Schutten, “Recovering Community: Addressing Judicial Blindspots on
Freedom of Association” in this collection (providing a critique of the Court’s limited
conception of associational freedom).
101 Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] S.C.J. No. 46, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 (S.C.C.).
102 But see Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996]
S.C.J. No. 38, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480 (S.C.C.) (per La Forest J.’s masterful majority opinion,
forging links between self-government, a free press and the open court principle, and
implementing that theory of s. 2(b) by requiring a sufficient evidentiary foundation for any
limits on open court). See also R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697
(S.C.C.) (per McLachlin J., dissenting, and discussing s. 2(b)’s values); Canadian Broad-
casting Corp. v. Lessard, [1991] S.C.J. No. 87, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 421 (S.C.C.) (per McLachlin
J., dissenting, drawing on rationales for a free press to propose an evidentiary standard for
search warrants against the press and media).
103 See Derek B.M. Ross, “Truth-Seeking and the Unity of the Charter’s Fundamental
Freedoms” in this collection (reflecting thoughtfully on the search for truth as an overarching
principle that unites the Charter’s fundamental freedoms). Under s. 2(b), see Robin Elliott,
“The Supreme Court’s Understanding of the Democratic Self-Government, Advancement of
Truth and Knowledge and Individual Self-Realization Rationales for Protecting Freedom of
Expression, Part 1: Taking Stock” (2012) 59 S.C.L.R. (2d) 435, at 436-37 (providing an
extensive review of the values and their functions in s. 2(b) doctrine, stating that the Court
has provided “very little in the way of guidance on the general conception of values that
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counterproductive force against freedom. In a way, Irwin Toy’s low threshold for
breach backfired by making it unnecessary to deepen the discussion of freedom
under section 2(b). Nor did that happen under section 1, where freedom’s values
entered the register to justify limits.104
Section 2(b) cannot flourish without an account of freedom. Elsewhere, the
perennial search for a singular theory or organizing principle has prompted a rich
first amendment literature that ceaselessly churns the relative merits of free speech
values.105 Short of joining that debate, two simple observations can provide a
starting point here. The first is that freedom is powerful, but fragile, and the second
is that it therefore poses a test of courage, and reciprocal courage. To explain,
freedom places a demand on tolerance, asking a democratic community to forego its
instinct to suppress what is objectionable, discordant, disruptive. Though those who
defend the courage of their convictions may be valorized, pilloried, or ignored, a
principled conception of freedom is uninterested in preferring some voices and
silencing others. Prizing freedom in turn demands reciprocal courage because
tolerating profound difference — granting space to all views and voices —
challenges a community to permit what is widely held and believed to be unsettled,
and even placed at risk.
It is not immediately obvious why a democratic community cannot protect its
values from challenge by those who are unlikeable or detestable, and may provoke
social anxiety in deliberate or reckless ways. When it adopts a truly inclusive view
of freedom, a community acts beneficently and in self-interest, from a place of
democratic humility. That humility is a function of insight into the limits of
individual and collective capacity for knowledge, understanding and empathy. It
reflects an acceptance that matters of truth and reality are dynamic, organic and
elusive. Those limits explain freedom’s power and define its value, but expose its
inform its application”, and that the Court has “very rarely engaged in careful and considered
analysis of the values” at the s. 1 stage, tending instead to treat them as “perfunctory”).
104 It is well beyond the scope of this discussion to join issue on the broader methodology
of “values” in Charter methodology, especially the concept of Charter values, other than to
note in passing the problems associated with values methodologies more generally. See also
The Honourable Peter D. Lauwers, “What Could Go Wrong with Charter Values?” (2019) 91
S.C.L.R. (2d) 1.
105 A voluminous first amendment literature engages in relentless debate and reflection on
free speech’s core values. Recent contributions include Alexander Tsesis, “Free Speech
Constitutionalism” (2015) U. Ill. L. Rev. 101 (proposing a general theory of free speech) and
David S. Han, “The Value of First Amendment Theory” (2015) U. Ill. L. Rev. 87, at 87. Not
all the discussion is celebratory, and much is critical or skeptical of the long-held premises
of free speech in the United States. See, e.g., P.E. Moskowitz, The Case Against Free Speech:
The First Amendment, Fascism and the Future of Dissent (New York: Hachette Book Group,
2019) (maintaining that freedom of speech has never existed and is empty, hollow, and
meaningless). In Canada, see, e.g., Richard Moon, The Constitutional Protection of Freedom
of Expression (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000).
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essential fragility. Freedom may be at or near its zenith when it is subversive of
dominant values, but that is also a touchpoint of vulnerability. In that setting, social
anxiety breeds intolerance of uncertainty, leading to demands for defensive
reaction.106
Forbearing from censoring and silencing discordant voices is not an easy ask for
a community that attributes its stability to the legitimacy of accepted values,
protocols and rules of self-governance. Recognizing that it is imperative to the
resilience of democratic community for beliefs, practice and values to be vulnerable
to change is profoundly a matter of trust. That trust fortifies a democratic
community’s reciprocal courage to withstand and even welcome forms of disruptive
uncertainty.
At once powerful and fragile, freedom — democracy’s most prized value — is
fraught with risk, and for that reason requires a risk management plan. Risk and
harm are elastic concepts grounded in subjectivity, running the spectrum from the
slightest offence against norms to the outright incitement of violence.107 Under a
system of rights constitutionalism, the point at which freedom poses unacceptable
risks and is subject to limits must be informed by principle and defined with
precision. Limits cannot be grounded in an instinct to suppress, an aversion to
unwelcome or hostile ideas, or a raw assessment of merit, content or value.
Any commitment to freedom must turn on two pivots. First is a philosophic
narrative of freedom’s value in an organic community that is resilient and open to
difference, tolerance and change under a framework of constitutional principle.
Second is a methodology that separates value from harm and focuses on an
evidence-based approach to limits on freedom. Reconstructing section 2(b) meth-
odology must therefore begin by rejecting the proposition that less valuable
expression per se deserves less constitutional protection. From there, a framework
for realizing section 2(b)’s potential must be grounded in a conception of freedom
that places conditions on the methodology of limits. It is critical for that framework
106 At present, access to public library space is ripe for censorial oversight through
demands for content-based, prior approval schemes. While public libraries in Vancouver and
Toronto resisted intense pressure to deny space to a controversial speaker, a less sturdy public
library in Ottawa foreclosed controversy by cancelling a rental agreement. See, e.g., “Toronto
Public Library Collaborators Condemn TPL’s Decision on Meghan Murphy Talk”, online:
change.org <https://www.change.org/p/toronto-public-library-toronto-public-library-collaborators-
condemn-tpl-s-decision-on-meghan-murphy-talk ​>; Libby Emmons, “Labour union tries to
shut down feminist speaker” The Post Millennial (February 19, 2020), online: <https://
thepostmillennial.com/labour-union-tries-to-shut-down-feminist-speaker​>. See also Weld v.
Ottawa Public Library, [2019] O.J. No. 4691, 2019 ONSC 5358 (Ont. Div. Ct.) (challenging
the termination of Ms. Weld’s contract for the rental of library space).
107 See generally Emmett Macfarlane, “Hate Speech, Harm, and Rights” in Emmett
Macfarlane, ed., Dilemmas of Free Expression (forthcoming, University of Toronto Press).
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to embed an evidentiary conception of harm.108
Finally, it is not only a conception of freedom that is lacking. As section 2(b)’s
connection to self-governance demonstrates, at critical junctures the jurisprudence
poorly or incompletely defends its underlying values. A robust conception of
freedom validates and preserves the community’s prerogative — as individuals and
a collective — to participate in and take steps to protect the integrity of democratic
governance.109 The Court’s repeated endorsement of this rationale has not translated
into a jurisprudence protective of self governance and its core values of transparency
and accountability.110 A case in point is its reluctance to recognize freedom of the
press and media as an independent section 2(b) entitlement.111 Despite rehearsing
and celebrating the role of the press on a number of occasions, the Court has been
unwilling to constitutionalize its institutional status and protect its functioning from
interference by the state.112
A troubling example is R. v. National Post, which implicated a sitting prime
minister in acts of corruption, conflicts of interest and even illegal activity.113 On its
face, and narrowly, the question was whether police could compel production of the
envelope containing an allegedly forged bank document. Yet by refusing to protect
a journalist’s confidential source, the Court failed to grasp or attribute importance to
108 In this, the Charter jurisprudence on the open court justice is a model. See Jamie
Cameron, “A Reflection on Section 2(b)’s Quixotic Journey, 1982-2012” (2012) 58 S.C.L.R.
(2d) 163, at 165 (declaring this jurisprudence s. 2(b)’s “crowning achievement”) and 184
(describing the thickness of the principle and the rigour of the Dagenais/Mentuck test as its
distinguishing features).
109 Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] S.C.J. No. 88, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712
(S.C.C.); Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R.
927 (S.C.C.).
110 See, e.g., Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 28, [2004] 1 S.C.R.
827 (S.C.C.); R. v. Bryan, [2007] S.C.J. No. 12, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 527 (S.C.C.) (upholding
limits on high-value political expression, pursuant to a deferential standard of justification
under s. 1).
111 See R. v. Vice Media Canada Inc., [2018] S.C.J. No. 53, [2018] 3 S.C.R. 374 (S.C.C.)
(concluding that it was neither desirable nor necessary to address the status of the press under
s. 2(b) and acknowledge it as an entitlement on its own). But see Canadian Broadcasting
Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] S.C.J. No. 38, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480
(S.C.C.) (providing exemplary analysis of the vital links between a free press, the open court
principle, democratic self-government, and the accountability of the courts and justice
system).
112 See generally Jamie Cameron, “Section 2(b)’s Other Fundamental Freedom: The
Press Guarantee, 1982-2012” in Lisa Taylor & Cara-Marie O’Hagan, eds., The Unfulfilled
Promise of Press Freedom in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017);
Benjamin J. Oliphant, “Would Independent Protection for Freedom of the Press Make a
Difference? The Case of Vice Media v. Canada Inc.” in this collection.
113 [2010] S.C.J. No. 16, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 477 (S.C.C.).
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the functional role of investigative journalism in promoting democratic account-
ability — in that instance, by exposing the Shawinigate scandal over a period of
time.114 In this, the Court was unmoved that no less than a full-scale investigation
into corruption in Canada’s highest elected office was at stake.115
Meanwhile, an earlier decision in R. v. Lucas116 reveals how values of
transparency and accountability were sideswiped by the contextual approach. There,
the Court upheld criminal convictions for defamatory libel that were aimed at
silencing two individuals who protested a miscarriage of justice by publicly calling
out the police officer in charge. In upholding jail sentences for both, the Court
missed the point that the Lucases were whistleblowers — albeit uncivil ones —
whose protest engaged section 2(b)’s core principles. Instead, Cory J.’s majority
opinion described their protest as inimical to the guarantee’s purposes, and
concluded that the criminal law should be available to offset the deficiencies of the
civil process. In that way, front-line workers, including police officers, are protected
from being defamed in the course of their duties.117 In this scenario, the Lucases
went to jail for carrying placards that damaged his reputation but pointed to
wrongful criminal charges in the dozens, and the officer’s failure to protect young
and highly vulnerable siblings from a known intra-familial sexual predator.118
Events at the time and afterward demonstrated that accountability and transparency
were fundamentally at stake.119 For these reasons, Lucas marks a serious misstep in
114 For a critique, see Jamie Cameron, “Of Scandals, Sources and Secrets: Investigative
Reporting, National Post and Globe and Mail” (2011) 54 S.C.L.R. (2d) 233. See also Globe
and Mail v. Canada (Attorney General), [2010] S.C.J. No. 41, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 592 (S.C.C.)
(proposing a more generous approach to journalist-source privilege).
115 Gaps in the jurisprudence were addressed by the Journalistic Sources Protection Act,
S.C. 2017, c. 22 (creating statutory protection for journalists from search and production, and
disclosure of confidential sources). See Denis v. Côté, [2019] S.C.J. No. 44, 2019 SCC 44
(S.C.C.) (interpreting the Journalistic Sources Protection Act).
116 [1998] S.C.J. No. 28, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 439 (S.C.C.).
117 R. v. Lucas, [1998] S.C.J. No. 28, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 439, at para. 74 (S.C.C.).
118 R. v. Lucas, [1998] S.C.J. No. 28, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 439, at paras. 4-6 (S.C.C.). Its
summary of the background facts leading up to the placard demonstration show that the
miscarriage-of-justice facts were before the Court at the time of the Lucas appeal.
119 An action in malicious prosecution against the officer succeeded at trial and was not
appealed, though actions against the child therapist and Crown Attorney failed on appeal. See
Miazga v. Kvello Estate, [2009] S.C.J. No. 51, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 339 (S.C.C.) (dismissing the
action against the Crown Attorney but describing the wrongful charges as a “clear miscarriage
of justice” that “undoubtedly had a devastating effect” on those charged, especially in the
absence of an acquittal) [the proceedings on dozens of charges were stayed in the early
1990s]. See also “Scandal of the Century” The Fifth Estate (December 20, 2011) (CBC
documentary in which siblings recanted their allegations against the 16 individuals who were
wrongfully charged, admitting that their tales of ritual sex practices were completely
fabricated) (copy of the CD on file with the author).
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section 2(b)’s development and history. Not only should defamatory libel be
removed from the Criminal Code, at the first opportunity the Court should distance
itself from the methodology and outcome in Lucas.120
Deficits on these points of self-governance, transparency and accountability bear
mention because they form part of section 2’s narrative, and are connected to the
theme of forgotten freedoms in yet another way. Weaknesses in this branch of the
jurisprudence reflect, refract and reinforce systemic problems and patterns in section
2’s concept of fundamental freedoms. In other words, a synergistic and holistic
approach to section 2’s freedoms must build from a robust response to each part of
the guarantee. Forgetting some freedoms, reading others down and failing to protect
their underlying values exposes cracks and weaknesses in the foundation that
compromise section 2’s discrete entitlements, as well as its integral whole.
VI. TOWARD A THEORY OF SECTION 2 CONSTITUTIONALISM
Now more than 35 years in the making, the jurisprudence records victories and
setbacks, demonstrating that even without a solid foundation of principle, section 2’s
fundamental freedoms can be protected. Despite reinforcement by the Charter, these
freedoms are fragile, subject to the pressures that buffet any dynamic, evolving
community. Experience under the Charter has demonstrated that freedom cannot be
protected by a contextual conception of entitlement. Equally important, section 2
lacks a baseline or overarching conception of freedom and a place in the Charter’s
matrix of rights. Long overdue, section 2 constitutionalism must be set in a
framework of principle that is holistic as well as responsive to each of its
fundamental freedoms.
After generating strong momentum early in the Charter’s interpretation, Big M’s
contributions to an overarching conception of freedom under section 2 were largely
overlooked and even forgotten. For different reasons, freedom under sections 2(b)
and (d) was misconceived and compromised at inception. Presented with opportu-
nities along the way, the jurisprudence failed to establish a beachhead of principle
to guard against encroachments on freedom. As noted, the Court could have moved
section 2(d) away from labour issues at an early stage in its development, and did
not.121 That, together with the Court’s resistance to non-association, shrunk section
2(d), both in concept and scope. Many years later, Little Sisters provided a
compelling setting for the Court to reflect more deeply and thoughtfully on the
fragility of expressive freedom, especially for those with marginalized voices who
were targeted in that case.122 The Court’s anemic response to systemic state
censorship in Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice)
revealed limited insight into Big M’s core insights on coercion and constraint.
120 Jamie Cameron, “Repeal Defamatory Libel” Centre for Free Expression (blog) (July
5, 2017), online: <https://cfe.ryerson.ca/blog/2017/07/repeal-defamatory-libel​>.
121 See discussion above.
122 [2000] S.C.J. No. 66, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120 (S.C.C.).
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Meanwhile, section 2(a)’s guarantee of freedom of conscience was sidelined, and
the Court has been unwilling or unable to show conceptual flexibility in interpreting
its central promises, especially when communal interests are at stake.123
A prescriptive theory of section 2 constitutionalism begins by exposing the limits
of the Court’s conception of freedom. The key take-aways in that discussion are
basic, but critical. First, the section 2 jurisprudence quickly lost contact with Big M’s
identification of coercion and constraint as profound threats to freedom. That insight
must be re-introduced and should infuse the section 2 jurisprudence, including
section 2(d). It should be accompanied by attention to self-governance and its
associated values of transparency and accountability, both in the context of the press
and media guarantee, and more generally.124 Second, a candid overhaul, not only of
the entitlement under section 2(b), but also of the limits calculus under section 1,
must be undertaken. In part because the jurisprudence never made a commitment to
freedom — qua freedom — the principle of content neutrality was subsumed in
caveats and a misuse of expression’s underlying values. The distortion of section
2(b)’s values as an instrument of limits and disproportionate attention to the question
of justification did not augur well for expressive freedom, and must be addressed.
Third, the section 2(d) jurisprudence must step away from its fixation with labour
relations issues. In the past, the Court has declined the opportunity to develop
associational freedom in non-labour contexts. When the issue recently arose in Law
Society of BC v. TWU, a majority of the Court chose not to address sections 2(b) or
(d), perhaps because doing so would accent the compound nature of the violation.125
Moreover, and to avoid undermining union authority, Lavigne and Advance Cutting
marginalized the concept of freedom from compelled association. In doing so, the
Court’s response to non-association disregarded Big M’s conception of freedom as
the absence of coercion, including indirect forms of compulsion. Finally, it is
unfortunate that the Court has not developed a role for section 2(d) as a bonding
agent for section 2’s guarantees, or considered how an infringement of associational
123 A recent example is Ktunaxa Nation v. British Columbia (Forest, Lands and Natural
Resource Operations), [2017] S.C.J. No. 54, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 386 (S.C.C.) (excluding a claim
of Aboriginal spirituality from s. 2(a)); see also Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson
Colony, [2009] S.C.J. No. 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567 (S.C.C.). See Benjamin Berger, “Is State
Neutrality Bad for Indigenous Religious Freedom?” in Jeffrey Hewitt, Beverly Jacobs &
Richard Moon, eds., Indigenous Spirituality and Religious Freedom (forthcoming), online:
SSRN <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3508967​>.
124 This point, made above, can be multiplied many times over. See, e.g., Doré v. Barreau
du Québec, [2012] S.C.J. No. 12, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 395 (S.C.C.) (dismissing the s. 2(b) claim
and upholding the Barreau’s decision to discipline a lawyer who wrote a private letter to a
judge which was impolite, but sought accountability at that level of personal interaction, for
the judge’s unacceptable behaviour toward him in court).
125 Law Society of British Columbia v. Trinity Western University, [2018] S.C.J. No. 32,
[2018] 2 S.C.R. 293, at para. 77 (S.C.C.).
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freedom — in the context of sections 2(a) or (b) — compounds the Charter
violation.
The challenge at this juncture is to revive the conceptual imagination that inspired
Big M’s interpretation of freedom, and return to the core principles of section 2’s
fundamental freedoms. In this, it is notable and promising that the Court undertook
a radical restructuring of section 2(d) that overruled a group of first-generation
precedents on associational freedom. More recently, Rowe J. and others have begun
a process of critical engagement with the underlying assumptions of Charter
interpretation and methodology.126 Opening up debate is positive, because it
promotes an active and organic interpretation of freedom that is candid about the
gaps and faults of the status quo, and forward-looking in framing a conception of
freedom for the future. At the least, it is clear that any retooling of section 2 is a
complex task that must proceed from and be based on a foundational concept of
freedom. Without offering a doctrinal panacea — for how could it? — Big M
modelled an approach to the essential question and challenge of protecting freedom
under the Charter. It is time now to pick up where Big M left off, pursuing a theory
of section 2 constitutionalism for each of the guarantees and for fundamental
freedoms as a whole.
126 See especially Rowe J.’s concurring opinion in Law Society of British Columbia v.
Trinity Western University, [2018] S.C.J. No. 32, [2018] 2 S.C.R. 293, at para. 77 (S.C.C.)
(calling for a review of the Doré methodology, offering a critique of Charter values, analyzing
the scope of Charter entitlement, and addressing the role of justification, including the burden
of proof).
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